Sudan’s information war: How weaponised online narratives shape the humanitarian crisis and response

A man looking at a wall struck by a shell in Khartoum. April 2023. Credit: Faiz Abubakr.

Sudan’s information war: How weaponised online narratives shape the humanitarian crisis and response examines how misinformation and disinformation have become weapons of war in Sudan's humanitarian crisis, directly obstructing aid delivery and fueling violence. While humanitarian organisations recognise these threats, their responses remain fragmented and reactive.

Meanwhile, Sudanese communities have developed grassroots verification networks through local volunteers, teachers, and religious leaders—efforts that remain largely unsupported by international actors. The report calls for treating information as essential humanitarian infrastructure, integrating community verification into formal systems, developing protocols for sensitive communications, and strengthening local media. The findings emphasise that humanitarian silence creates dangerous information vacuums that malign actors exploit.

Read on/click below for a summary of:

What did we look at?

  • How harmful information functions at systemic levels, such as the role of state and non-state actors in spreading disinformation and its impact on humanitarian action, community trust and institutional legitimacy.

  • How mutual aid groups, media actors and emergency networks verify and share information under conditions of extreme connectivity constraints.

  • The country’s evolving media ecosystem and what may strengthen information integrity in Sudan.

  • Sudan’s contested information terrain, e.g. frontline practices of local actors, as well as the strategic deployment of manipulated and inauthentic digital narratives by powerful warring actors.

  • Real-world consequences of information disorder, from delays in life-saving aid to violence justified by weaponised narratives.

What did we find?

There are currently significant gaps in responding to harmful information. Humanitarian actors are recognising the dangers posed by misinformation, rumours, propaganda, malinformation and disinformation, such as disrupting aid delivery, eroding trust and compounding the vulnerability of communities affected by crisis. Yet their response is fragmented, short-term and reactive.

Tried and tested responses, such as risk communication and community engagement efforts, are often thematically siloed, underfunded and disconnected from broader operational strategy. Narrative monitoring and community feedback systems are largely project-based, with no shared protocols or consistent escalation pathways. Coordination structures acknowledge harmful information risks but lack dedicated mechanisms or skills to respond, leaving frontline staff without clear guidance on how or when to respond. This all against the backdrop of sector-wide budget cuts, which will weaken existing community engagement and two-way communication, reducing efforts to ensure transparency, explain the humanitarian mandate, manage expectations and build trust.

Sudanese communities have shown remarkable adaptability and developed courageous strategies to expose malign manipulation of narratives, verify information, protect one another and uphold the humanitarian imperative under immense pressure. As often seen in other contexts, such as Lebanon, local informal networks—youth volunteers, teachers, religious leaders and former NGO staff already act as interpreters and validators of ‘aid’ information. Yet all these practices are largely informal and go under the radar, unnoticed and unsupported by international actors, and disconnected from formal humanitarian planning.

In a fragmented conflict environment, organisations often default to caution or silence to avoid backlash or accusations of partiality. But this silence leaves an information vacuum in which harmful narratives can spread unchecked, undermining protection outcomes and eroding community trust.

Key recommendations

The report identifies three essential strategic shifts that the sector must embrace to strengthen its capacity in order to respond to harmful information in Sudan effectively:

  1. Treat the information environment as a strategic and critical part of humanitarian response. Trusted, timely and context-sensitive information must be treated as ‘information as aid’, essential to enabling access, protecting lives and improving the overall return on humanitarian investments. This requires investing in communication infrastructure that supports trust and rapid clarification—including improved connectivity where feasible, but also interoperable feedback systems, shared monitoring tools and long-term partnerships with local media. Donors should invest in developing an actionable metric to track and measure the humanitarian implications of disinformation.

  2. Integrate community verification and interpretation into humanitarian models. Local networks already clarify, interpret and mediate aid information in real time. Humanitarian systems must recognise, resource and safely embed these networks into formal strategies. This includes supporting community-led tracking and response tools, funding local harmful information-monitoring, providing surge capacity during crises, and adapting partnership requirements to fit local realities.

  3. Understand, don’t avoid, conflict sensitivities. Avoiding politically sensitive communication often creates dangerous information voids that malign actors can exploit. Humanitarian actors need clear internal protocols for assessing when and how to respond to politically sensitive rumours. This requires staff training, coordinated messaging strategies to avoid contradictory responses, and supporting locally informed, politically aware and transparent communications.

  4. Strengthen Sudanese media as an alternative to harmful information. Conflict, funding cuts and repression threaten Sudan’s public-interest journalism when it’s most needed. Local media and radio stations require sustained financial support and capacity building to ensure community access to verified information.

Topline takeaways from the report

  • Information is now a strategic and frontline issue. Misinformation, disinformation and hate speech are not peripheral threats—they shape who receives aid, who is targeted and who is trusted. Treating communication as core humanitarian infrastructure is essential.

  • Silence is not neutral. Humanitarian actors’ risk-averse communication strategies often create dangerous information vacuums that are filled by politicised and weaponised narratives. Caution must not become complicity.

  • Local verification saves lives. Mutual aid groups, teachers, youth volunteers and community leaders are already verifying aid-related information under extreme constraints. Their efforts are effective but remain under-recognised and unsupported by formal systems.

  • Mis and disinformation are fuelling violence and obstructing access. False narratives have directly led to civilian deaths, blocked aid deliveries and justified attacks on humanitarian workers. Collective real-time tracking and verification mechanisms are urgently needed.

  • Trust is infrastructure. In highly polarised environments like Sudan, operational success hinges on trusted relationships, inclusive communication practices and transparency—not just logistics or funding. Building and protecting that trust must be seen as a central pillar of any humanitarian strategy going forward.

  • Digital platforms are failing communities in high-risk contexts. Reporting harmful content is slow, ineffective and perceived as futile. Greater engagement is urgently needed from technology companies to support trusted local actors and moderate content in a manner that is sensitive to local knowledge and languages.

  • Resilience lies in localisation. Durable solutions will not come from imported toolkits or ‘silver bullet’ campaigns. Long-term, strategic investment in local systems, media partners and decentralised communication networks is critical.

This project was funded by the H2H Network’s H2H Fund, which is supported by UK aid - from the British people. 


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