



communicating with disaster affected communities

# Assessment of Surge Capacity for Communication and Community Engagement

February 2018

This learning review was commissioned by CDAC Network and  
undertaken by independent consultant Jo de Serrano



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## Acknowledgements

Thanks to Marian Casey-Maslen for her support and to Lisbeth Pilegaard who undertook the review of the CDAC Roster on behalf of NORCAP. Special thanks to all key informants and respondents to the survey who contributed to this study, as well as the Steering Committee for their guidance. Thanks also to Juli Dosad Editing.

## Definitions

Within the field of recruitment, the terminology used to explain how staff are managed differs and can mean different things to different organisations. For this paper, the word roster is used to mean a database of candidates, who are recruited against specific job descriptions/profiles/competencies, inducted, and trained, and, who may be available for deployment. There is no guarantee that candidates on a roster will be available for deployment at any given time. The word rota is used to describe a set period of time when a candidate, from a list of candidates is on call to perform a particular role and where their availability is guaranteed.

The term “deploy” is used to signify anyone mobilised to undertake work. This could be an international deployee, seconded by a Standby Partnership (SBP) partner into a UN agency, or a national Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) staff member working in a response capacity during an emergency. Deploy in this context does not necessarily mean to a different location within the same country or overseas but is used to mean undertaking a discrete role.

## Abbreviations and Acronyms

AAP	Accountability to Affected Populations
ASP	Associate Surge Pool
CCE	Communications and Community Engagement
CCEA	Communications, Community Engagement and Accountability
CCEI	Communications and Community Engagement Initiative
CCCM	Camp Coordination and Camp Management
C4D	Communication for Development
C4Die	Communication for Development in Emergencies
CE	Community Engagement
CEA	Community Engagement and Accountability
CJS	Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability
CTP	Cash Transfer Programming
CwC	Communicating with Communities
DFID	Department for International Development
ERP	Emergency Response Plan
H2G	How to Guide
HAO	Humanitarian Affairs Officer
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
HumCom	Humanitarian Communication and Media
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICCM	Inter-Cluster Coordination Mechanism
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross
IM	Information Management
IMO	Information Management Officer
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
IOM	International Organization for Migration
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NMFA	Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NORCAP	NRC's deployment capacity standby roster
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PSEA	Prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse
SBP	Standby Partnership
ToRs	Terms of Reference
ToT	Training of Trainers
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme
WHS	World Humanitarian Summit

## Introduction

The Communicating with Disaster Affected Communities (CDAC) Network comprises over 30 members including humanitarian, media development organisations and technology providers. The aim of the CDAC Network is to “bring together diverse local, regional and global actors to catalyse communities’ ability to connect, access information and have a voice in humanitarian emergencies.”

One element of the CDAC Network’s role in meeting this objective is to develop capacity at both an individual, organisational and country level. This is achieved through a number of activities, including a roster of skilled deployable experts within the field of Communications and Community Engagement (CCE), highlighting and providing learning opportunities in that field.

Since 2014, the Norwegian Refugee Council’s (NRC) standby roster, NORCAP, in collaboration with the CDAC Network has managed a roster, the Humanitarian Communications (HumCom) roster, recruiting against Terms of Reference (ToRs) defined by the CDAC Network for secondment into CDAC Member and non-Member agencies, including United Nations (UN) agencies. Whilst originally, the ToRs referred to recruitment in Communicating with Communities (CwC), the terminology was amended to Communication and Community Engagement (CCE) and disseminated widely by the CDAC Members Council in 2016, as part of the development of the CDAC Network 2016-2021 Strategy. However, for the purpose of this report, which concerns surge capacity as opposed to the field of CCE, the author uses the term CwC as it is the terminology used in the roster ToR.

While the number of requests for technical support for communication and communicating with communities is rising, some concerns have been raised that the current roster or standby profiles do not fully match what is needed at country level. As a result, the CDAC Network decided to take a stock check of CCE surge capacity, how the CDAC network can support that capacity and to identify any surge gaps that need to be addressed.

## Methodology

This study comprised a desk review of relevant documentation, a survey of CDAC members and interviews and correspondence with 37 key informants. See Annex 1

## Current State of Surge Capacity

The Communicating with Disaster Affected Communities (CDAC) Network comprises over 30 members including humanitarian, media development organisations and technology providers. The aim of the CDAC Network is to “bring together diverse local, regional and global actors to catalyse communities’ ability to connect, access information and have a voice in humanitarian emergencies.”

The definition of surge capacity is broad, and whilst some organisations, such as the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) treat surge capacity as time bound in response to a new or worsening humanitarian situation, others, including the Standby Partnership (SBP) define surge as where the organisation lacks the technical expertise or where demand for capacity exceeds the organisations internal capacity both inside and outside of a response. In the context of CwC, surge capacity can be split into 4 categories:

1. NORCAP (HumCom roster) for deployment into UN agencies and other organisations
2. SBP rosters for deployment into UN agencies for either their own or collective response

requirements

3. CDAC Network member organisations' rosters for their own (primarily) or collective response requirements
4. Other organisations, including UN agencies<sup>1</sup>, Red Cross Movement, INGOs or NGOs rosters for their own response requirements

## 1 NORCAP

In 2014, Internews, the CDAC Network and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) developed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for the creation of the Humanitarian Communication and Media Roster (HumCom). The MOU was never signed, however the intention to work collaboratively on surge capacity was present, and recruitment was proposed against the following generic ToRs:

1. CwC Coordinator
2. Team Leader and Humanitarian Communications Specialist
3. Humanitarian Liaison Officer
4. Humanitarian Communications and Media Specialists/Trainers
5. CwC Monitoring & Evaluation Officer<sup>2</sup>

Prior to the establishment of the HumCom roster, Internews had maintained a list of several hundred candidates who they considered to have skillsets matching elements of a CwC profile, but who had never been vetted. This list was reduced to 46 by the CDAC Network Roster Manager and details were passed to NORCAP, who invited 26 to apply against the generic CwC ToRs. Of these, 20 applied and were accepted onto the roster.<sup>3</sup>

NORCAP felt applicants lacked either UN agency experience, or linguistic skills and/or were not available for long-term deployment as required by UN agencies and so today the HumCom roster has 18 candidates, of whom 12 have been categorised as CwC, with the remaining 6 categorised under Humanitarian Communication, including public information, journalism, mobile technologies and media communication. It is unclear against which of the 5 stated profiles the remaining 12 relate.

Since the original Department for International Development (DFID) and Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NMFA) funding, no further funding has been forthcoming, despite attempts by both parties to attract investment. The lack of programme funding has meant that the CDAC Network and NORCAP have been unable to invest in further roster development. To date, funding for deployments has been drawn primarily from NORCAP with some deployments funded by NRC and DFID.

The HumCom roster has, to date, only deployed staff into UN agencies, either to support the UN agency's own CwC Community Engagement (CE) or Accountability to Affected Population (AAP) commitments, or working for the collective response, most notably in Cox's Bazar and in Greece. There have been no deployments to non-UN organisations in an emergency; an attempt to deploy into a national organisation in South Sudan was problematic due to duty of care concerns. The MOU envisaged using HumCom capacity to support organisations outside of a response, but this has not materialised.

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1/ Excluding those UN agencies who are part of the CDAC Network.

2/ The ToRs can be found here: <http://www.cdacnetwork.org/tools-and-resources/humanitarian-communication-and-media-roster/>

3/ There are differing opinions as to the numbers of candidates' details passed to the CDAC Network and NORCAP. These are the NORCAP figures.

## 2 The Standby Partnership (SBP) & UN Agencies

The SBP has existed since 1991 to support the UN through the provision of surge capacity across a range of profiles. There are currently 14 UN agencies and 45 Standby Partners comprising Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), private sector entities and governmental organisations. Since the inception of the HumCom roster, NORCAP has recorded 30 requests by UN agencies for CwC positions, and data from UNICEF, OCHA, UNHCR, WHO and IOM show 24 filled positions across all Standby Partners,<sup>4</sup> which includes related posts, such as C4D in emergencies (C4Die) and AAP.<sup>5</sup>

### Understanding what is Required

Lack of clarity around profiles within the accountability sphere and the words Communication or Communicating within the job title has led to the proposal of candidates from the communications sphere only. The lack of understanding between roles and vague ToRs received from Country Offices make it hard for Standby Partners to identify the right candidates. In trying to meet the request, Standby Partners will look wider and will propose candidates not necessarily registered against a CwC profile. This in turn has led to sourcing candidates outside of the SBP and then rapidly recruiting to a standby partner's roster for immediate secondment, which is time consuming for all concerned.

### Demand and Supply. Supply of What?

Demand for this profile from within UN agencies is not high at present, although it is expected to grow. The absence of demand means that Standby Partners, including NORCAP have had to prioritise resources and so whilst Standby Partners can foresee growth will be required, resources to recruit for CwC is competing against other profiles, such as cash transfer programming (CTP). Whilst ToRs exist against which NORCAP recruits, it is unclear whether these are suitable for UN agencies' needs, where different approaches are being identified and implemented. For example, OCHA has renamed CwC to CE and it is linked to their generalist Humanitarian Affairs Officer (HAO) profile. In addition, OCHA is amending ToRs to attract those with more generalist coordination expertise. UNICEF has a C4Die profile, which was born from the C4D profile within a development context. To date, no UN agency interviewed had provided Standby Partners with a generic CwC ToR against which they could recruit to their roster<sup>6</sup>. Matching candidates to secondment positions is challenging.

### Finding the Right Skillset

When recruitment did occur, the lead times between date of request and actual date of deployment were significantly longer than those across other profiles within the SBP.<sup>7</sup> In addition, deployees were at times found not to be sufficiently high level to have the experience and gravitas to engage with the HC and HCT and to advocate and guide the response. In addition, the lack of language or coordination skills also impacted on the success of deployments. Where coordination skills were required, deployees at times possessed technical skills only and lacked the experience to pull the response together, or, where qualified, were drawn into advising on technical aspects, pulling them away from their coordination focus. At a country level, the lack of experience within UN agencies has often meant deployees are given free rein to implement the CwC response and are responsive, supportive, inclusive and appreciative of the support incoming specialists bring.

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5/ Data is unclear due to different data capture methodologies and the absence of information across all UN agencies within the SBP.

6/ OCHA released a generic CwC ToR at the 2013 annual Standby Partner Consultation in 2013, but this has since been retracted.

7/ At the 2017 annual Standby Partner Consultation, the average number of days between request date and deployment was 25 days.

## Training

Whilst UN agencies and Standby Partners have developed technical training for WASH, Information Management (IM), Early Recovery etc., current low demand for CwC means that none has been developed for CwC or other related profiles such as AAP. However, OCHA is looking to bolster their existing training and are exploring ideas for an interagency, standardised and accredited training for Standby Partners. UN agencies would welcome more input from the CDAC Network in terms of technical consultations, best practice, resource sharing, training development and coaching during secondments.

## Donor Support

Whilst donor signatories to the Grand Bargain have committed to ensuring the participation revolution takes place and are starting to require that partners include accountability frameworks within their programmes, no donor interviewed had made available any additional funds for Standby Partners, or other organisations to invest in attracting and developing new talent within this field, although they expected partners to deliver on this agenda.<sup>8</sup> As of December 2017, selected Standby Partners' rosters contained the following candidates

CANADEM - AAP: 100, CwC:100, C4D: 259 – roster of approximately 44,000<sup>9</sup>  
DFID – has partnerships with DRC, NORCAP, CANADEM and RedR Australia  
DRC – 0 (but they do have AAP)  
Irish Aid – 0  
MSB – 1<sup>10</sup>  
NORCAP – 12  
RedR Australia – CwC: 10, AAP: 8 and CwC/AAP: 6

## 3 CDAC Network Members

CDAC Network members have continued to maintain their own internal lists or rosters of candidates for deployment, and have in the case of Ground Truth Solutions, invested substantial time and money in developing and managing their own roster. Just under half of survey respondents indicated that they provided training in CwC, but that it was difficult to monitor who had been trained and to what level. At the time of writing, Internews were advertising for their emergency roster of humanitarian personnel. The posts advertised, Humanitarian CwC Engagement Officer, Humanitarian Feedback Analyst, Humanitarian Liaison Officer, Humanitarian Multimedia Trainer and Humanitarian Team Leader<sup>11</sup> are of a similar nature to those recruited onto the NORCAP managed CDAC Roster.<sup>12</sup>

In April 2017, the CDAC Network published a policy paper on collective platforms, services and tools<sup>13</sup>, including recommendations for ensuring a collective approach to communication and community engagement at both global and national levels. The paper follows on from the Grand Bargain and Agenda for Humanity and includes 8 recommendations, putting preparedness and localisation at the centre. It recommends that all organisations mainstream a collective approach to CwC within the humanitarian programme cycle (HPC) and Emergency Response Plan (ERP), and to adhere to principles on quality and accountability including

8/ Including DFID, Global Affairs Canada (GAC), DFAT Australia and the US Department of State.

9/ To note, CANADEM operates just in time resourcing. Applicants to the CANADEM roster, self-screen and skills are assessed at interview. The number of candidates possessing the full range of CwC/AAP/C4D is likely to be substantially lower.

10/ For the domestic context, this is called "Crisis Communications". MSB has deployed a number of secondees in line with the accountability agenda throughout the last couple of years. MSB strongly supports the efforts that reinforce and put in practice the accountability agenda, such as CwC and AAP.

11/ <https://www.internews.org/apply-jobs-internews> [Accessed 19th February 2018]

12/ They are: CwC Coordinator, Team Leader and Humanitarian Communications Specialist, Humanitarian Liaison Officer, Humanitarian Communications and Media Specialists/Trainers and CwC Monitoring & Evaluation Officer

13/ <http://www.cdacnetwork.org/contentAsset/raw-data/ca0a2c16-a6f6-4e53-86e2-9ea75fbbcb31/attachedFile>

the Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability (CHS). In addition, the paper recommends more flexible funding from donors for communication and community engagement. The policy paper reiterated the commitment to “further development of a roster of experts both for surge deployments as well as deployments that support country level mechanisms establish preparedness activities outside times of emergency.” The recommendations, if implemented by humanitarian organisations, from donors, to INGOs, NGOs and UN agencies, all have implications for future surge capacity.



# Findings and Recommendations

## Finding 1: Just what is CwC and how does it relate to accountability?

The learning review is an opportunity to reflect together on experiences of communication and community engagement during the response, and for shared learning. It will highlight examples of good practice, lessons learnt and where and why challenges arose. The views of affected people will be captured; their experiences of accessing information, of communication and engagement during the response, as a starting point in influencing future planning and preparedness for any future response. It is hoped this review will help build a picture of what a successful communication and community engagement response looks like in such a context, and map what is needed from different actors to achieve this. It will make recommendations on how CCE can be improved in Dominica and to CDAC and H2H on their role.

### Definition

The principal issue that arose which impacts on surge capacity, was a lack of understanding across the humanitarian sphere of what CwC is and how it fits within the Grand Bargain, the IASC's Accountability to Affected People Commitments and the Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability (CHS). These all outline the requirement for a participatory approach, to share information with affected communities and for feedback and complaints mechanisms to be in place within the humanitarian programme cycle.

### Terminology

Many within the humanitarian community are not fully conversant with CwC, and, as a result it is now merging into different terminologies and being confused with others within the same broader concept. Those fully conversant are also changing the terminology used, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) who now refer to Community Engagement and Accountability (CEA), which they feel more adequately represents CwC and AAP for their organisations. OCHA refers to their surge capacity as working in Community Engagement (CE). In addition, the donor community is focused on accountability, and not communication as part of an accountability framework, DFID's 2017 Humanitarian Reform Policy mentions accountability 5 times, but does not refer to communication or communicating at all.

### Accountability

It appears that very few, if any, outside of the CDAC Network understand the full range of functions required within the accountability approach including elements such as, communication as aid in its own right and two-way communication and dialogue, going beyond sharing information about an organisation's own programme and who they are, inclusive communication technologies, broadcast technology, focusing instead on organisational accountability. If the CDAC Network does not align itself with the broader objective, it could marginalise them in the debate and preclude them from funding opportunities, including for the development of surge capacity.

Many respondents also stated that the terminology doesn't matter, but in terms of surge capacity, terminology does matter. Hiring managers will look for skills and competencies against specific profiles, and software programmes used to manage rosters will categorise candidates accordingly. The terminology used helps differentiate between requirements, and whilst those working in the field may know exactly what is required when requesting candidates, some don't, and so generic ToRs against a profile will facilitate making requests. Categorisation of profiles also helps those responsible for searching databases for the right candidates

Currently, with a long list of possible profile names, roster managers will have to categorise candidates against all possible profiles, in order to ensure that searches against any of those profiles will retrieve all candidates. In addition, software used by roster managers will need to be set up to accommodate the range of profile names. Having multiple names also doesn't facilitate data analysis either within or across organisations, making it more difficult for organisations and entities such as the SBP to obtain comparable data to analyse trends and make decisions on issues such as future recruitment requirements. This includes this study, which had to incorporate CwC, AAP, CEA, CCE, CE, HAO/CwC, C4D, C4Die and CWC/AAP, in order to obtain the full picture.

### **Recommendation 1:**

For deployment into UN Agencies, UN Agencies to merge the CwC and AAP profiles under the banner of Communications, Community Engagement and Accountability (CCEA) to support the development of surge capacity through Standby Partners against the accountability framework.<sup>14</sup>

### **Finding 2: The Multi-faceted nature of CCEA**

With regard to the question of what, respondents reflected that CCEA is more multi-faceted than the current ToRs describe, and that there needs to be recognition of multiple components in order to facilitate a greater understanding amongst those managing rosters, so that they can recruit appropriately, and for those requesting, so that they understand what they need to request for each context. Respondents referred to a holistic ToR which includes a menu of options, clarifying the different components including, for example, public information, feedback and complaint mechanisms, community engagement and broadcast technologies for implementation, as well as coordination skills. Those coordinating the response, as part of a national coordination platform such as a CEA Working Group<sup>15</sup>, will require a different skillset to those implementing the response and that there is a need to have a much more flexible idea on skills, capacities and background.

The IFRC reflected on their change of terminology and that moving away from the word "communication" and by expanding their job description, they attracted a different type of candidate, including applicants from the field of community mobilisation, social organisation and community participation, as well as from the communications / media sectors. Others noted that the current ToRs are too "buzz-wordy" and that a focus on what practically needs to be done would be preferable.

### **Recommendation 2:**

The CDAC Network to expand the current ToRs to include the technical aspects, as well as coordination skills to facilitate a greater understanding by both roster managers and hiring managers of the full range of CCEA surge capacity. A menu of options comprising the constituent elements of accountability or a wider range of ToRs should be developed.

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14/ As this recommends a change in name from CwC to CCEA, CCEA will be used going forward, except where noted.

15/ Also called the CwC Working Group, depending on the context. Whilst this paper recommends renaming CwC to CCEA in relation to the surge profile, it will continue to use the name CEA Working Group.

### Finding 3: Why, When, Where, What and Who?

To establish what surge capacity you require, you first need to establish the answers to the following questions.

- Q Why you need surge capacity?
- Q When surge capacity will be utilised?
- Q Where capacity will be best utilised?
- Q What skills are required?
- Q Who should be deployed

#### Why? When? Where?

Through reviewing the current state of surge capacity, it is clear that there is a need for surge capacity to support the needs of the humanitarian system to deliver on both their individual and collective outcomes on accountability, and that this is required in both preparedness and response, at headquarters, regional and country level. Surge staff are deployed both to and from headquarters and to and from regional offices, either to support preparedness or during a response. The issue of where can be further disaggregated at a country level into where support will be most effective during a response. Humanitarian organisations require their own internal capacity, who in turn will attend, feed into and take messages back from the CEA Working Group or other coordination mechanism.

#### What? Who?

Respondents from the CDAC Network recognise the challenges of recruiting staff with this technical expertise and of mainstreaming across all staff and the humanitarian programme cycle. One respondent stated that it is a challenge to find staff who comprehend the difference between CwC<sup>16</sup> and the wider accountability agenda and who can lead teams to deliver comprehensive programmes. Respondents also acknowledged that the pool of technical experts is small and that the establishment of CEA Working Groups as an interagency initiative for every response would be most efficient, where senior staff undertake coordination roles.

However, there is a difference of opinion as to whether the coordination role within a response requires comprehensive understanding of CCEA or whether coordination and soft skills, gravitas and knowledge of humanitarian architecture is sufficient. Many see this level of gravitas as vitally important, especially whilst Humanitarian Coordinators (HC) and Humanitarian Country Teams (HCT) are grappling with this concept and where success is often dependent on engaged leadership.

Those who stated that CEA Working Group

Coordinators need to be technical specialists, noted that a technical background was needed to recognise how facets in others' responses form part of the whole. Others noted that having a non-technical CEA Working Group Coordinator would only work if the CEA Working Group was comprised of technical experts, but unfortunately at present that is not the case.

Organisations send attendees who are not familiar with CCEA or don't send anyone at all, which can result in the Coordinator having to work in a more technical capacity than envisaged by their ToRs. Therefore, it makes sense that currently coordinators have to be drawn from the CCEA community.

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16/ CwC terminology used by the respondent.

In parallel, the CDAC Network Secretariat has a role in building the capacity of implementing organisations' internal capacity through guidance and training to surge staff, as CCEA is mainstreamed, and already has a capacity strengthening programme which includes training on CCEA, using local actors as co-facilitators. As the concept of accountability and its constituent parts embeds within the humanitarian field, this should facilitate a move towards requiring less technical knowledge at a coordination level.

### **Recommendation 3:**

As a preparedness initiative, the CDAC network should expand their support to implementing organisations, at national, regional and global level to incorporate CCEA within their response, so that deploying staff are able to engage effectively within the CEA Working Group.

### **Finding 4: How will they be Deployed?**

Utilising surge capacity from within the affected country or region, requires an understanding of what capacity exists, and what, if any capacity building is required to ensure that incoming international surge can work effectively and not duplicate or overwhelm pre-existing structures. As the international system is not yet fully conversant with incorporating CCEA into their way of working, effort will need to be focused at both a local and international level, the latter including HCs, HCTs, NGOs and UN agencies. An effective CCEA response requires effective implementation and coordination, both of which the system is lacking at present and which the CDAC Network can support.

However, it is impossible to support a local response in every country and so they should focus on establishing priority countries. The CDAC Policy Paper identified OCHA's Rapid Response Approach to Disasters (RAPID) as an initiative with which it could engage. This would also align with the CCEI's objectives.

### **Recommendation 4:**

The CCEI should expand its focus countries to collaborate with OCHA's RAPID approach, supporting local surge, and, if required, work with CDAC Network member organisations to assign a CEA Working Group Coordinator in each of the priority countries.

### **Types of Expertise**

The CDAC Network strategy and policy paper commits the network to building and maintaining a roster of deployable surge capacity, which, to date, NORCAP has been undertaking as part of a partnership with the CDAC Network.

The original objective of the MOU between the CDAC Network/Internews and NORCAP was to enable deployments to help organisations, both UN and non-UN to build capacity outside of a response and to support during a response. It is clear that position has not changed and there is still a need to;

1. Support organisations, including the UN, at national, regional and global level to build technical CCEA capacity for their own response, outside of a response (already addressed by recommendation 3)
2. Support UN agencies and Standby Partners to build technical CCEA capacity to support the UN during a response (see point 5 below)
3. Support a collective inter-agency mechanism for CCEA Coordination, staffed at an appropriate level, in terms of skill and competencies and for the appropriate timeframe.<sup>17</sup> (see point 6 below).

## Finding 5: UN Secondments – Technical Expertise

### NORCAP

The unsigned MOU between Internews, the CDAC Network and NORCAP envisaged that recruitment would be a shared responsibility; the CDAC Network fed into interview questions and provided names to participate on an interview panel, but interviews took place without their input. It is, however, unclear whether prospective panellists were contacted as NORCAP staff managing the roster at that time have now left the organisation, and, if contacted, were available to participate in interviews.

Respondents raised concerns that NORCAP lack the technical expertise to assess candidates' skills, which, whilst not necessarily fulfilling the full range of the CwC ToRs, contained elements useful within different contexts and which needed to be retained. Others pointed to the multi-faceted nature of CCEA which can be drawn from a range of contexts and which may not be evident during application screening, leading prospective talent to be disregarded. Respondents were especially concerned that candidates who are respected within the CCEA field had applied and not been accepted and therefore questioned how decisions were made. The intention of the roster was also to serve non-UN agencies and so respondents questioned whether NORCAP's candidate assessment failed to capture skills and competencies relevant for non-UN contexts.

Lack of resources and competing demands on part of the CDAC Network Secretariat, meant that they were unable to contribute as much as it had hoped to the recruitment process, and it acknowledges that it could have been more engaged. NORCAP also suffered from the loss of a key member of staff and have struggled to dedicate enough attention to the HumCom roster since that time. Some respondents felt that NORCAP was not responsive during the early days of the relationship, which has progressively worsened. Both parties acknowledge that the failure to attract funding limited communication and progress on roster management.

### All Standby Partners

Whilst NORCAP has developed specialist rosters such as ProCap, GenCap and CashCap, this has not prohibited other partners from developing their own capacity, either through their own identification of the requirement for such expertise, or upon requirement by their donor(s). Rosters such as ProCap, GenCap and CashCap require programme funding which has not been forthcoming for CCEA and where the donors interviewed for this study have not expressed an interest in supporting a similar mechanism. As a result, Standby Partners have been unable to systematically invest in building this capacity. The absence of resources, combined with a lack of understanding as to the breadth of what is meant by CCEA, led respondents to express concern that candidates proposed by all Standby Partners for UN secondments failed on the majority of occasions to be suitable for positions. Respondents cited the inclusion of predominantly media, public information and generalist communications candidates. In addition, it is not clear, whether the ToRs for the roles were sufficiently defined to enable candidate selection. In that situation, Standby Partners propose a quite broad set of candidates, but that in turn leads requesters to question Standby Partners' ability to select suitable candidates.

### Why the SBP?

Whereby most organisations build rosters for internal use, the SBP is an anomaly in surge capacity, in that partners build and manage rosters on behalf of other organisations and then pay to second candidates into UN agencies, all funded by donors. When considering

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17/ There is also an argument to deploy Information Management Officers into CCEA coordination mechanisms, as is the case for cluster coordination.

building capacity in “new” areas such as CCEA, it is important to ask questions, such as what capacity already exists within UN agencies and what demand is there for secondments within this profile? It is important to stress, that Standby Partners are under no obligation to meet demand, and indeed partners choose their priorities in many ways, including thematic requirements from donors, regional or country focus, and also through an assessment of competing demands. At present for example, CCEA is competing against cash transfer programming (CTP) profiles.

Other questions also come into play, such as why should it be free to the recipient organisation via secondments through the SBP? Are funds available from within UN agencies through which CCEA deployees could be recruited? Or, what obligation is there on the UN to build their own capacity and not become over reliant on standby partner deployees? Some secondments operate on a cost recovery basis, such as with the Global Logistics Cluster<sup>18</sup> and so why could this not work in this context? If indeed the idea is that accountability is mainstreamed, then it points to support needed to staff as opposed to short-term SBP deployees. Rosters such as OCHA’s Emergency Response Roster of internal staff for deployment up to 6 weeks or its Associate Surge Pool (ASP) of pre-cleared consultants for deployment funded by OCHA could all be utilised. The SBP is not the only route to ensuring that the UN has access to technical expertise.

The SBP functions at its best for positions at P2-P4 level; higher levels can be problematic due to regulations prohibiting deployees being in a supervisory position, spending or decision-making authority. This paper argues that lower graded technical expertise be



seconded by UN agencies themselves and by Standby partners.

The SBP has been in this position before, where the growth in the demand for a profile outstrips the supply and the capacity to understand what is meant by that profile was limited. The UN has, at times, compensated for this by seeking out specialist partners, such as Veolia for water and sanitation expertise and iMMAP for Information Management Officers (IMO).

As an example, the profile of IMO has changed considerably over the years, where a one stop shop job description is still used, but nuances are built in depending on the context. It took many years for UN agencies to develop their internal capacity in this area and to be in a position to offer Standby Partners support. The CDAC Network is perfectly placed to ensure it doesn't take years to ensure this level of support in CCEA, both to UN agencies and to their Standby Partners who express a desire to build this capacity.

There is a challenge with the SBP, in that the same candidates will be on multiple rosters, and time and money will have been dedicated to their application, screening and induction by each standby partner. However, there is a benefit to this situation, whereby being on different rosters enables matching partner funding to the right candidate. If, for example, the ideal candidate was on NORCAP's roster, but NORCAP lacked the funding to support that deployment, then the UN would be forced to accept the next best candidate from another partner's roster, or no candidate at all. If, however, that same candidate was on RedR Australia's database and they had the funding, then the ideal candidate would be able to deploy. There is therefore value in supporting multiple rosters, instead of 1 roster to deliver technical CCEA capacity. Whilst this might seem to promote inefficiencies in the SBP, whilst donors and partners do not agree to coordinate on priority profiles whereby 1 partner focuses on 1 profile, and a second partner a second profile, this situation will remain. The existence of many rosters promotes healthy competition and supports deployments based on merit, as opposed to the availability of funding.

### **Recommendation 5:**

The SBP to develop CCEA technical capacity as per recommendation 2 for secondment into UN agencies. This recommendation advocates against a single NORCAP managed CDAC roster and recommends all Standby Partners work to identify candidates with the appropriate skillset from within their current rosters or through recruitment.

### **Finding 6: UN Secondments – Coordination Expertise**

The CEA Working Group is an interagency initiative, which is often led by the lead UN Agency. CEA Working Group Coordinators to date have been either seconded into this position through the SBP or recruited on a consultancy basis by UN agencies. Some respondents noted that CCEA coordination should be an OCHA lead as part of the Inter Cluster Coordination Mechanism. However, whilst OCHA does not have to lead the working group, both the Inter Cluster and HCT ToRs have been amended to ensure the CEA Working Group reports into the Inter Cluster Coordination mechanism. There is no requirement that the CEA working Group is led by any UN agency, and thought could be given to the CEA Working Group as an H2H initiative.

It appears that there is not enough capacity at a coordination level, as evidenced by the challenges faced by UN agencies with securing standby partner employees with the right skills, and where the average time from request to deployment is much longer than with other secondments. In addition, it is a seller's market, where the lack of available expertise results in deployees being able to command a higher daily fee. One respondent advised that they were unable to take on more than 1 standby partner secondment per year as the daily fee is

too low. There is however expertise at the right level and with the right skillset within CDAC Network Members which could be capitalised on during a response.

With Standby Partners, roster management, deployment activities and duty of care remain with the deploying organisation and the same could be considered in this context. The relevant CDAC Network organisation deploys their member of staff, pays them their usual salary, manages their deployment and maintains duty of care for their deployee. The CDAC Network as a whole would be responsible for providing guidance and training to prospective deployees only, and where mentoring and coaching could also form part of this arrangement.

Deployments would operate on a rota basis, with organisations obligated through their membership to designate who from their organisation would deploy within a set timeframe. The CDAC Network could draw on guidance which already exists across humanitarian organisations to support the establishment and maintenance of such a rota. This could be implemented as a time-bound initiative, with CDAC Network Members agreeing to support the coordination mechanism for a set period, whilst UN agencies and Standby Partners build their capacity. This incentivises Standby Partners and UN agencies to build capacity with CDAC Network Members' support. See example at Annex 4

### **Recommendation 6:**

The CDAC Network Secretariat manages a light touch rota comprising appropriately qualified and skilled CDAC Network members' staff for deployment into responses as CEA Working Group Coordinators. Where possible, deployments should be undertaken on a cost recovery basis.<sup>19</sup>

### **Finding 7: Non-UN Secondments**

Standby partners are well established in seconding into UN agencies, but seconding to other organisations proves particularly tricky, especially within emergencies. The majority of secondments through the SBP are for 3 months or more and roster candidates are recruited on that basis, whereby other rosters may include a mix of candidates for both short and long-term deployments. Utilising Standby Partners to second outside of the UN implies a different set of operating procedures, guidelines, roles, responsibilities and commitments which are time consuming to implement. In addition, seconding into organisations generally implies the need for MOUs or other types of agreement between organisations, which can be challenging and lengthy to negotiate, especially when taking into consideration duty of care obligations.

Some Standby Partners have had to temporarily suspend seconding into UN organisations due to duty of care concerns. Following on from a discussion during an annual consultation, the SBP established a working group on duty of care obligations to their staff seconded into UN agencies. In 2012, one secondee kidnapped whilst on mission sought compensation for economic and non-economic loss and won, requiring the payment of compensation.

Against this backdrop, it is easy to see how seconding into non-UN organisations is difficult for current Standby Partners to undertake and is especially challenging within emergency contexts. In addition, agreements with donors may specify UN secondments only, and agreement to second staff into non-UN entities would require approval. The SBP is also fairly self-contained, with 14 participating UN agencies, and where partners do not have to sign

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<sup>19/</sup> Some UN agencies are able to deploy staff under reimbursable loan agreements (RLAs), but some, such as OCHA are restricted by regulation.

up with each agency in order to participate: Some partners have MOUs with 1 organisation only and others having MOUs with many, including NRC with 13 and MSB and CANADEM with 11 MOUs. Whilst some UN agencies are newer to the SBP than others, the group of UN agencies into which Standby Partners second staff is not big. The same cannot be said for the number of non-UN entities which may need support either inside or outside of a response.

Secondments to non-UN entities are challenging for Standby Partners to undertake, and therefore the CDAC Network Secretariat need to prepare non-UN entities in advance of emergencies, to compensate for the absence of seconded staff during emergencies.

### **Recommendation 7:**

The CDAC Network Secretariat should acknowledge that secondments into non-UN entities are problematic and instead focus on preparing organisations through

### **Finding 8: CDAC Network Member Organisations**

The exact responsibilities of each CDAC Network member vis-a-vis establishing and maintaining a roster are unclear. The application to be part of the CDAC Network asks, “how your organisation will, as a CDAC Network Member, help drive improvements in communication and community engagement.” and the 2016-21 strategy states that the CDAC Network will “Develop capacity at the individual and agency level, by highlighting and providing training and peer-to-peer learning opportunities around the world, and maintaining a roster of skilled deployable experts.”

The MOU which was drafted between the CDAC Network and NORCAP for roster inception, but which was never signed, provided for definition of roles and responsibilities for onward collaboration including recruitment, interview participation, roster design, operating model budget and promotion, governance, management, fundraising, and sustainability. This MOU could be used to guide the CDAC Network to identify explicit roles and responsibilities for each of its members.

### **Recommendation 8:**

The CDAC Network Secretariat to make the obligations of the CDAC Network’s members vis-à-vis support to surge capacity, including SBP roster development and deployments within a collective response explicit, and to ensure that these are upheld.

### **Finding 9: Funding for CCEA Surge**

This paper recognises that recommendations made have both financial and human resource implications. However, the CDAC Network is a collective, working towards collective outcomes and therefore the responsibility for implementation should also be collective. Financial and human resource responsibility shared between 31 members, reduces the input required, however when each of those 31 members is a small organisation, any input can be challenging. There is always the trade-off that moving forward requires work and how best to resource work is challenging.

The CDAC Network has recently agreed not to increase membership fees, as they are considered too high by many organisations and therefore other funding must be sought to cover the costs of managing the roster and other recommendations included within this paper. Whilst donors are not currently supporting building CCEA surge capacity, both inside

and outside the SBP, there is a window of opportunity created by the alignment of terminology with the accountability agenda through which to seek funding for the implementation of recommendations within this paper.

Obtaining funding will not, in itself, imply that implementing recommendations won't require work to be undertaken by CDAC Network members and therefore the CDAC Network Secretariat should consider carefully how to balance that work so that it isn't always the usual suspects contributing, which can breed resentment on the part of that partner and on others who may perceive input as resulting in outcomes skewed towards the major participating partner.

With regard to deployments, if CEA Working Group Coordinator deployees are drawn from CDAC Network Members, then funding the deployment would be the responsibility of the seconding member or be funded through a reimbursable loan agreement (RLA) with the relevant UN agency. The CDAC Network would again need to consider sharing the burden for deployments across members. Further funding for deployments could be leveraged through DFID's Rapid Response Facility (RRF), where existing CDAC Network members are already pre-qualified.

It should be noted that much of the original costs for managing a roster were found via the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and DFID, under their Disaster and Emergencies Preparedness Programme (DEPP). DEPP funding also included substantial funding to the Start Network's Transforming Surge Capacity Project, which aimed to make surge capacity more effective and efficient across the humanitarian sector through promoting coordination and collaboration, and where initiatives such as collaborative CDAC surge have a natural home. DEPP funding has now finished and so there is a risk that gains made within the Transforming Surge Capacity Project are lost, and that ongoing initiatives such as CDAC surge are underfunded, hampering ability to make progress.

### **Recommendation 9:**

The Participation Revolution and Standby Partners to lobby donors for funding CCEA, both inside and outside of emergencies as part of a systematic programme to increase surge capacity.

### **Finding 10: Training / Guidance**

The CDAC Policy Paper notes that it is the aim of the CDAC Network to be an expert hub for obtaining guidance on practice for CCEA. With this in mind, the CDAC Network currently provides:

- an e-learning course from Infoasaid<sup>20</sup> which “aims to raise awareness about the key components of effective communication with crisis-affected communities, and to build knowledge and skills on how to communicate in practice“;
- webinars and videos<sup>21</sup>; and
- a 5-day technical training<sup>22</sup> which is “an introductory course on how to ensure that people affected by crisis have the information they need and that they are able to communicate with each other and with those trying to help them.”

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20/ <http://www.cdacnetwork.org/learning-centre/e-learning/>

21/ <http://www.cdacnetwork.org/learning-centre/webinars-and-videos/> empty at the time of writing 12th January 2018

22/ <http://www.cdacnetwork.org/learning-centre/foundation-training/> modular format which can also be taught individually.

Respondents pointed to the need for more technical training, especially at a local level and for this to be sustainable, through the training of trainers (ToT). In addition, they identified the need for toolkits for field practitioners: the CDAC Network is currently developing a How to Guide (H2G) which will provide deployees with tools and guidance for during deployment and UNICEF is developing a companion toolkit, both of which aim to meet the need for technical training.

One respondent noted that CDAC material was not used because of the focus on communications, as opposed to the humanitarian programme cycle, however this has now been addressed with recent changes, shifting the focus onto information provision, participation, complaints and feedback mechanisms. CDAC Network training encourages national actors to participate and where the Humanitarian Programme Cycle may not support the bottom up, localisation approach.

In November 2017, the CDAC Network and the IASC AAP/PSEA Task Team held a workshop to review existing resources around AAP (including community engagement, communications and protection from sexual exploitation and abuse (PSEA), aimed at field practitioners and managers at individual organisation and collective levels. The workshop identified gaps in resources and next steps on resource development and the need for a survey of practitioners around the usefulness of the tools available. This was undertaken, and a full list of resources and tools were distributed to CCEA, AAP and PSEA focal points in February 2018. These resources, combined with expanded training as per recommendation 3, should help to address needs of implementing organisations as outlined in section 7 and to contribute towards making the CDAC Network an expert hub. Periodic review of resources and tools is always recommended to ensure relevance and utility.

Regarding deployments in a UN context, one respondent noted that the training and guidance currently offered, did little to address the needs of UN and standby partner deployees, especially if the focus is at an expert, coordination level as opposed to the technical level. However, the training offered was never intended for UN deployees and so there is a disconnect between intention and understanding that should be addressed. At present, there is limited training available for SBP deployees, although the SBP's Common Induction Training Package does refer to standards to be upheld, such as the CHS. To build capacity of candidates held on SBP rosters, consideration should be given as to the training delivery modality which would be most effective. This could include;

- “Just in time” e-learning, providing deployees with on the spot information immediately before deploying or on-demand whilst deployed. Where training is undertaken far in advance of need, there is a risk that knowledge is lost. Just in time learning creates a link between need and imminent action.
- Coaching, such as the helpdesk-aap-psea@unhcr.org offered by the IASC Task Team on Accountability to Affected Populations and Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (AAP/PSEA). Subject matter experts from within and outside the CDAC Network could be on call to coach deployees.
- Mentoring programmes, a programme whereby mentees are mentored by subject matter experts from within the CDAC Network to undertake the role of CEA Working Group Coordinator.

Training and guidance for deployees has to be provided across 3 levels; leadership, coordination and technical, representing the 3 levels at which surge deploys, as opposed to the functions they perform. Training already exists for the technical level and the CDAC Network is committed to rolling this out within national contexts. However, deployees into

CEA Working Group Coordination roles may require coordination training as a supplement to the technical training available. In addition, if the concept of deploying an Information Management Officer (IMO) alongside the CEA Working Group Coordinator is taken forward, then training to meet that need should be considered.

### **Recommendation 10:**

The CDAC Network Secretariat and the SBP Training Secretariat to consider whether current training resources work for UN surge with a view to developing structured learning pathways for candidates on SBP rosters. The review should include a review of available cluster coordination training courses which focus on soft-skills, as opposed to technical expertise, as well as on information management.<sup>23</sup>

### **Finding 11: Where to find Surge Capacity – The Development Sphere**

It can be assumed that there is no capacity, based on the difficulties in securing staff through the SBP, but respondents identified that there is much capacity, but there is no process to define what capacity they need, transferable skills and learning pathways. The CCEA arena is a tight, informal network of people, and some respondents noted that there is kudos in being one of the 15 or 20 people globally who understands the full range of functions required in a response and, who, as a result are able to identify components in others' programmes which are in some way part of the CCEA response. Growing that pool of 15-20 people is vitally important.

As recommended earlier, the key to finding new talent is linked to knowing what functions will be performed and having the ability to identify and assess that capacity from candidate applications. Respondents noted that those from the fields of CCCM, protection and WASH would possess some of the skillsets required. Between them, Standby Partners have approximately 50,000 candidates on their rosters, including CCCM, protection and WASH candidates, and Human Surge adds an additional 11,000 to that number. It therefore it makes sense that there is unidentified capacity within those rosters. A recommendation on working with Standby Partners to identify new talent from within their rosters was made earlier (recommendation 5).

Respondents identified that CDAC Network member organisations are a key source of deployees, both at a coordination and technical level, as well as to act as mentors to others. A recommendation on deploying staff from CDAC Network members was made earlier (recommendation 6).

Other respondents noted that a key source of surge for CCEA is the development sphere, where a participatory approach has been mainstreamed for much longer. Sourcing prospective deployees from the development sphere would require a focus on support required on familiarity with humanitarian architecture.

The majority of people who undertake the CDAC Network technical training are national staff of implementing organisations who have never or rarely deployed in an international context. However, they demonstrate skills and experience which could be valuable within an international context, including in a coordination role, such as CEA Working Group Coordinator. One such deployee was identified through CDAC Network training in Kenya and

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23/ To note. The SBP Training Secretariat operates against a yearly workplan and is guided by a Steering Committee. Inclusion of additional workstreams would require Steering Committee approval.

is currently undertaking the role of CEA Working Group Coordinator in Dominica. Capacity identified in this way could benefit from a structured learning pathway including a mentoring

### Recommendation 11:

The CDAC Network Secretariat to identify candidates from within training and Standby Partners to target the development sphere as a source of prospective CCEA deployees, both for inclusion on SBP rosters.



## Conclusion

Humanitarian response is only as good as the people that manage a response, and so it makes sense for organisations to invest in surge capacity, either internal or external to their organisations. That investment can be a heavy one if managed by one organisation alone, but the CDAC Network has a wealth of experience at its fingertips from within its membership who can help spread the load in both recruitment to rosters and participating in a rota for deployment of their own staff to support responses.

The Standby Partnership's 45 partners also have experience in roster management that can be utilised to great effect. However, to recruit onto rosters, those undertaking recruitment need to be able to assess applicants' technical capabilities. When profiles are new and not so well understood, external support is often required. CDAC Network organisations can help build capacity of Standby Partner rosters through screening, interviewing and assessing candidates.

That the current rosters are not achieving the objective for deploying CCEA personnel is evidenced by CDAC Network members building their own rosters and advertising for surge capacity for their own needs, as well as the time taken to identify and deploy suitable candidates within the SBP. The skills and experience that are required to work towards accountability to affected populations is far broader than those established within the current ToRs and therefore a review is required to establish the full range of requirements, so that hiring managers are able to understand better what is required, roster managers can recruit against those skillsets and competencies, and organisations both within and outside of the CDAC Network are able to request and find the right person for the job.

The terminology around this area is challenging, and there are many who say that the name does not count, but in the realms of managing rosters and surge capacity it does make a difference. The computer programmes that are used to manage candidate data can't automatically make the leap between CwC and AAP or CCE and so the links between them either need to be built into the programme, which of course takes time and costs money, or those managing the roster have to remember each time to search for CwC, AAP and CCE if they want to retrieve candidate data. Extracting statistics and analysing trends is further complicated by the plethora of acronyms within this field. Aligning terminology, at least within the self-contained field of the Standby Partnership would help to alleviate some of these issues.

Candidates with potential to undertake coordination roles need to be identified and then training at both a technical and coordination level provided. Working with Standby Partners to identify staff from within their current rosters should identify appropriate candidates, as should targeting the development sphere and CCEA technical training. Fortunately, resources and tools to help others learn about CCEA at a technical level and to support implementation are well developed, however further work must be undertaken to build soft and coordination skills amongst identified candidates. In addition, training without putting it into action quickly can mean the knowledge and skills obtained are quickly lost and so other methods, such as mentoring, shadowing and e-learning may be more appropriate.

Surge capacity is most effective when it is able to link with appropriate local, regional or international mechanisms and / or fit within preparedness initiatives such as OCHA's RAPID approach. Expanded and continued support by the CDAC Network to organisations to mainstream CCEA within their response means that local staff can manage the response, supported, if necessary by regional and international staff.

The CDAC Network Secretariat is small and resources are scarce. Donors have high expectations that organisations should be accountable to affected populations, and rightly so, but there seems to be little comprehension of how challenging it will be for the humanitarian community to build the human resource capacity to ensure that takes place. People are our best assets in a response and without the right people, responses will not achieve the desired outcome. Building rosters, managing rotas, training, and managing deployments is extraordinarily time consuming, but there is very little interest at present from the donor community in investing in that capacity. Roster managers need to be resourced appropriately and those within the sphere of CCEA have a role to play in advocating to donors to contribute to systematic support to this area. Failure to do so, will leave the humanitarian community in a situation where demand for expertise outstrips the supply and responses will suffer as a result.



## Annex 1 – Key Informants and Survey Respondents

Alice Hooper	DFID, Humanitarian Deployments Manager
Amy Rhoades	IOM, Community Engagement Programme Manager
Andy Wheatley	DFID, Humanitarian Adviser
Angela Rouse	CDAC Network Secretariat, Senior Programme Manager
Anne Cath da Silva	Ex NORCAP
Benedicte Giaever	NORCAP, Director
Cat Kenyon	ActionAid International, Transforming Surge Capacity Project, Project Manager
Charles-Antoine Hoffman	UNICEF, Communication & Community Engagement Initiative Senior Adviser
Chris Demerse	Global Affairs Canada Deputy Director Strategic Analysis and Planning Unit
Chris Ford	CDAC Network, DEPP Programme Manager
Dusan Jovanovic	CANADEM, Roster Director
Eilish Hurley	UNHCR, Emergency Partnerships and Deployments Officer, Standby Partnership
Eleonora del Balzo	OCHA, Standby Partnership
Fergus Thomas	DFID, Humanitarian Adviser
Hilde Faugli	NORCAP
Jacobo Quintanilla	ICRC, Community Engagement Advisor
John O'Meara	Irish Aid
Jon Bugge	Independent Consultant
Judith Greenwood	CHS Alliance
Kate Half	Executive Secretary, Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR)
Katie Drew	UNHCR, Innovation Officer: Communicating with Communities
Lisbeth Pilegaard	Independent Consultant
Lois Austin	Independent Consultant
Maria Rowan	US Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration,
Marian Casey-Maslen	CDAC Network Director
Matt Croucher	Save the Children, Deputy Director, Humanitarian Preparedness & Response
Meg Sattler	Independent Consultant, working with OCHA on Community Engagement
Nick van Praag	Ground Truth Solutions
Nicol U	IOM, Standby Partnership
Ombretta Baggio	IFRC, Coordinator, Community Engagement
Prashan Thalayasingam	IFRC, Community Engagement
Rie Ishii	WFP, Standby Partnership
Sarah Mace	CDAC Network, Capacity Strengthening Advisor
Sharon Hicks	DFAT, Assistant Director   Humanitarian Preparedness & Response Section
Stijn Aelbers	Internews, Humanitarian Adviser
Tanya Axisa	IASC Task Team Coordinator for AAP and PSEA
Virginia Moncrieff	Independent Consultant

<b>Survey Respondents</b>
World Vision International
First Response Radio
Translators Without Borders
BBC Media Action
Action Aid International
WHO
OCHA



## Annex 2 – UN Secondments

Country	Location	Profile	Partner	Agency
Bangladesh	Cox's Bazaar	Communicating with Communities	NRC	UNHCR
Greece	Larissa	Field Officer CwC	NRC	UNHCR
Greece	Lesvos	Communicating with Communities	NRC	UNHCR
Greece	Attica - moved to Bo	CWC	NRC	UNHCR
Greece	Lesvos	Field Officer CwC	NRC	UNHCR
Greece	Thessaloniki	Field Officer CwC	NRC	UNHCR
Peru	Quito	CwC/AAP	NORCAP	IOM
Roving	Homebased / Roving	CwC Expert	NORCAP	IOM
Bangladesh	Cox's Bazar	CwC Working Group Coordinator	NORCAP	IOM
Bangladesh	Cox's Bazar	CwC Technical Advisor	NORCAP	IOM
Bangladesh	Cox's Bazar	CwC WG Coordinator	DFID	IOM
CAR		HAO/CwC	CANADEM	OCHA
Nigeria		HAO/CwC	NRC	OCHA
CAR		CwC	NRC	OCHA
Nigeria		HAO/CwC/AAP	NRC	OCHA
Haiti		CwC	NRC	OCHA
Peru		CwC	NRC	OCHA
Somalia		CwC	MSB	OCHA
Fiji	Suva	C4D Specialist	RedR Aust	UNICEF
Uganda	Kampala	C4D in Emergency Specialist	Irish Aid	UNICEF
Bangladesh	Cox's Bazaar	C4D in Emergencies Specialist	NRC	UNICEF
South Sudan	Aweil	C4D Specialist Emergency	NRC	UNICEF
DRC	Goma	Senior Country Level AAP Advisor	NRC	UNICEF
Jordan	Amman	AAP - Senior Advisor	NRC	UNICEF

24/ As this recommends a change in name from CwC to CCEA, CCEA will be used going forward, except where noted.

## Annex 3 – Recommendations

**Recommendation 1:** For deployment into UN Agencies, UN Agencies to merge the CwC and AAP profiles under the banner of Communications, Community Engagement and Accountability (CCEA) to support the development of surge capacity through Standby Partners against the accountability framework.<sup>24</sup>

**Recommendation 2:** The CDAC Network to expand the current ToRs to include the technical aspects, as well as coordination skills to facilitate a greater understanding by both roster managers and surge requesters of the full range of CCEA surge capacity. A menu of options comprising the constituent elements of accountability or a wider range of ToRs should be developed.

**Recommendation 3:** As a preparedness initiative, the CDAC network should expand their support to implementing organisations, at national, regional and global level to incorporate CCEA within their response, so that deploying staff are able to engage effectively within the CEA Working Group.

**Recommendation 4:** The CCEI should expand its focus countries to collaborate with OCHA's RAPID approach, supporting local surge, and, if required, work with CDAC Network member organisations to assign a CEA Working Group Coordinator in each of the priority countries.

**Recommendation 5:** The SBP to develop CCEA technical capacity as per recommendation 2 for secondment into UN agencies. This recommendation advocates against a single NORCAP managed CDAC roster and recommends all Standby Partners work to identify candidates with the appropriate skillset from within their current rosters or through recruitment.

**Recommendation 6:** The CDAC Network Secretariat manages a light touch rota comprising appropriately qualified and skilled CDAC Network members' staff for deployment into responses as CEA Working Group Coordinators. Where possible, deployments should be undertaken on a cost recovery basis.

**Recommendation 7:** The CDAC Network Secretariat should acknowledge that secondments into non-UN entities are problematic and instead focus on preparing organisations through both face to face and remote training and guidance (see section 10).

**Recommendation 8:** The CDAC Network Secretariat to make the obligations of the CDAC Network's members vis-à-vis support to surge capacity, including SBP roster development and deployments within a collective response explicit, and to ensure that these are upheld.

**Recommendation 9:** The Participation Revolution and Standby Partners to lobby donors for funding CCEA, both inside and outside of emergencies as part of a systematic programme to increase surge capacity.

**Recommendation 10:** the CDAC Network Secretariat and the SBP Training Secretariat to consider whether current training resources work for UN surge with a view to developing structured learning pathways for candidates on SBP rosters. The review should include a review of available cluster coordination training courses which focus on soft-skills, as opposed to technical expertise, as well as on information management.

**Recommendation 11:** The CDAC Network Secretariat to identify candidates from within training and Standby Partners to target the development sphere as a source of prospective CCEA deployees, both for inclusion on SBP rosters.

## Annex 4 – Rota Example

The CDAC Network's 26 full members could establish a deployment rota, where each organisation would make a member of their staff available for deployment for 3 months. If a rapid-onset emergency occurred within that timeframe, they would be mandated to deploy until a suitable replacement is found within the SBP. Administration, deployment support and duty of care would remain the responsibility of the deploying organisation and guidance and support to the deployee would come from within the CDAC Network, its training materials and through coaching. Deploying 2 people at a time, could also meet the information management needs that are required as part of the role. With 1 deployee, staff from 4 organisations would be on call within any given year, and with 2 deployees, 8 organisations would be on call. With 26 full members and 1 deployee, this would mean organisations are on call once every 3 years. Furthermore, as capacity within the SBP increases, the need for a rota managed and staffed by the CDAC Network should decline and the CDAC Network should review whether they wish the rota to be time-limited.

	Q1 2018	Q2 2018	Q3 2018	Q4 2018	Q1 2019	Q2 2019	Q3 2019	Q4 2019
<b>WG Coordinator</b>	Ground Truth Solutions	Save the Children	In-ternews	ICRC	World Vision International	UNCOM	Trans-lators Without Borders	Thom-son Reuters Foundation
<b>IMO</b>	BBC Media Action	Plan Interna-tional	IOM	Action Aid	Interna-tional Media Suport	UNICEF	Dahlia	UNHCR



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communicating with disaster affected communities

*The CDAC Assessment of Surge Capacity for Communication and Community Engagement was funded by UK aid from the UK government through the Department for International Development's Disasters and Emergencies Preparedness Programme.*

